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Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth
Management Act Implementation That
Avoids Takings and Substantive Due
Process Limitations 1
Jeffrey M Eustis *
The State of Washington recently joined the select group
of states that have adopted statewide standards for land use
planning.2 Statewide land use planning arrived in Washington
through two recently adopted laws: the Growth Management
Act of 1990 and the Growth Strategies Act of 1991 (GMA). 3
These laws mark a significant change in land use regulation in
the State of Washington. Formerly, local governments
remained almost exclusively responsible for land use regula-
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principally represents citizen and environmental groups. On the topic of growth
management, Mr. Eustis represented the interests of the Washington Environmental
Council on growth issues during the 1991 and 1992 legislative sessions. He is also a
founding board member of 1,000 Friends of Washington.
1. "So her advice ran; but I faced her, saying:
Only instruct me, goddess, if you will, how, if possible, can I pass Kharybdis,
or fight off Skylla when she raids my crew?
Swiftly that loveliest goddess answered me:
Must you have battle in your heart forever? The bloody toil of combat? Old
contender, will you not yield to the immortal gods? That nightmare cannot
die, being eternal evil itself- horror, and pain, and chaos; there is no fighting
her, no power can fight her, all that avails if flight."
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 225 (R. Fitzgerald trans., Doubleday 1961). In this passage Odys-
seus appeals to Circe for advice on navigating his craft between the twin perils of Cha-
rybdis, the whirlpool, and Scylla, the cave dwelling monster on the shore. J. FINLEY,
JR., HOMER'S ODYSSEY 132 (Harvard University Press 1978).
2. The states of Oregon, Florida, Georgia, and Massachusetts have adopted laws
that establish statewide statutory standards for land use planning. See OR. REV. STAT.
ch. 197 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-163.3215 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-3546.1 (Harrison Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 41 (West
Supp. 1993).
3. Growth Management Act, 1990 Wash. Laws 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17 (amended
by Growth Strategies Act, 1991 Wash. Laws 2903, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 32, and Open Space
Corridors-Use and Management of Land Within Corridors, 1992 Wash. Laws 1050, ch.
227) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 36.70A (West 1991 & Supp. 1993), WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. ch. 47.80 (West Supp. 1993), and WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.02 (West
1991 & Supp. 1993)).
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tion. The planning enabling laws for cities4 and for counties5
give skeletal guidance for land use planning. And, except for
the requirement that comprehensive land use plans include
land use and transportation elements,6 these planning statutes
are largely content and value neutral. They therefore provide
scant direction to guide the locally adopted plans and
regulations.7
Thus, perhaps the most profound change brought about by
the GMA is its articulation of statewide planning goals and its
prescription that land use planning accomplish certain mini-
mum objectives.8 Among these minimum objectives are
requirements that certain critical areas (such as wetlands) be
protected,9 that agriculture, forest, and mineral resource lands
be conserved,' 0 that urban growth be directed to urban growth
areas," that public facilities be adequate to serve development
at the time that development is available for occupancy,' 2 and
that local governments have the authority to impose develop-
ment impact fees to fund certain designated facilities and
services. 13
When implemented by way of local plans and regulations,
these basic objectives will affect the use of private lands in at
least three ways. First, they will reduce the intensity of devel-
opment in critical areas and resource lands. Second, they will
potentially delay development in areas that lie beyond urban
growth areas or that cannot be concurrently served with public
facilities and services. Finally, development within urban
areas will become more costly as municipalities are given the
authority to impose a portion of the costs of furnishing public
4. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. chs. 35.63, 35A.63 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
5. Id. ch. 36.70.
6. Id. § 36.70.330 (West 1991) (pertaining to counties); id. § 35A.63.061 (West 1990)
(pertaining to municipal code cities).
7. For example, as to counties, the Revised Code of Washington provides that the
land use element to the comprehensive plan shall designate "the proposed general
distribution and general location and extent of the uses of land" and shall further
provide "for protection of the quality and quantity of ground water used for public
water supplies .... Id § 36.70.330(1) (West 1991).
8. The GMA sets forth thirteen planning goals to "be exclusively for the purpose
of guiding the development of comprehensive plans and development regulations." See
id. § 36.70A.020.
9. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 36.70A.030(5), .060, .170 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
10. Id.
11. I& § 36.70A.110(1).
12. Id § 36.70A.020(12) (West 1991).
13. Id § 82.02.050(1)(b) (West Supp. 1993).
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facilities and services on the landowner. The GMA thus marks
a transformation in how future growth is to be planned for and
where it is to go. This transformation, in turn, imposes addi-
tional burdens on landowners and affects what an individual
landowner is able to do with her land.
This type of regulation in land use has been met with a
backlash of legal challenges. In recent years, many of these
challenges have been favorably received by the courts. A
series of recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
and the Washington State Supreme Court indicate that land
use restrictions will be much more closely scrutinized under
both the Takings Clause and substantive due process doc-
trine.14 The challenge presented to local governments is the
implementation of effective growth management legislation
that will survive this heightened scrutiny. The uncertain
future implementation of growth management will largely be
decided through administrative and judicial decisions and
tested under takings and substantive due process case law.
Thus, in formulating growth management legislation to
meet continually evolving standards, local planners and
lawmakers find themselves confronting perils every bit as
treacherous as those faced by Ulysses. On the one hand is the
risk that courts may find highly protective legislation to "go
too far" under takings jurisprudence or to be "unduly oppres-
sive" under substantive due process. On the other hand,
lawmakers could attempt to steer clear of judicial challenges
by enacting weak legislation that does little to accomplish the
objectives of growth management. Either course would frus-
trate the implementation of the GMA.
This Article takes the position that no reason exists for
local legislation implementing the GMA to necessarily run
afoul of these twin perils. But, to steer a safe course, local
decision-makers must pay close attention to the standards
imposed by recent court decisions. Specifically, they must
closely tailor their plans and development regulations to the
objectives of the GMA and to the impacts it seeks to alleviate;
they should provide procedural protections that avoid harsh
14. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Robinson
v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); and Sintra,
Inc. v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992). After
this Article went to print, the Washington Supreme Court handed down two additional
takings and due process cases. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1
(1993); Margola Assocs. v. Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993).
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results; and they should enact their plans and regulations in a
well-documented process. The purpose of this Article is to pro-
vide a background in takings and substantive due process law
to enable local governments to accomplish this task.
An analysis of the extent to which legislation implement-
ing GMA objectives will run afoul of the takings and substan-
tive due process limitations carries its own inherent
limitations. First, only interim designations and protections
for critical areas and resource lands have been adopted to
date.15 For the twenty-six counties and one hundred eighty-
one cities that are planning under the GMA, the original dead-
line for comprehensive plan adoption was July 1, 1993,16 and
the deadline for adoption of development regulations imple-
menting comprehensive plans was July 1, 1994.17 During the
1993 session, the legislature extended these deadlines by one
year for the adoption of comprehensive plans and an additional
six months, upon request, for the adoption of development reg-
ulation."8 Consequently, for the most part, the legislation
implementing the GMA has yet to be adopted.
The second limiting factor is that the holdings in takings
cases turn principally on the facts of each case. To compound
this limitation, case law in this area is in a state of flux. Conse-
quently, the issue of whether future growth management legis-
lation will exceed constitutional limits as defined by future
courts involves a high degree of speculation.
This Article begins with an overview of the GMA. It then
proceeds with a summary of recent case law under the Takings
Clause and substantive due process doctrine. After laying this
groundwork, this Article focuses on four particular areas of
growth management control and explores how local legislation
implementing these areas of control would be analyzed under
the Takings Clause and substantive due process. These four
areas of land use regulation include: critical area protections,
resource land designations, development phasing requirements
for concurrency and urban growth areas, and impact fees for
public facilities and services. This Article then concludes with
15. The designations and protections for critical areas and resource lands are
"interim" in the sense that these regulations are to remain in effect until development
regulations covering all lands are adopted by July 1, 1994. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 36.70A.060(2), .120 (West 1991).
16. d § 36.70A.040(3).
17. Id. § 36.70A.120.
18. ESHB 1761, 1st Spec. Sess., 1993 Wash. Laws 2564, ch.6.
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several brief observations as to measures that may be taken to
protect growth management legislation from takings and sub-
stantive due process challenges.
I. THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT
A. Background
The Washington State Legislature enacted the GMA in
1990 in response to the growth pains of the 1980s: traffic con-
gestion, school overcrowding, urban sprawl, and loss of rural
lands.' 9 These conditions inspired evocative photographs of
endless lines of cars and of subdivisions and shopping centers
rolling up against rural lands. The GMA was also enacted in
part to respond to a far more ambitious citizen's growth man-
agement initiative, Initiative 547.2o
In enacting the GMA, the legislature borrowed heavily
from growth management measures enacted in other states.
For example, the urban growth areas concept largely came
from the urban growth boundary requirement of Oregon's
Comprehensive Land Use Planning Coordination Act of 1973,21
and the transportation concurrency requirement came from
Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act of 1986.22 In other respects,
the GMA contains features that are unique to Washington. In
keeping with the state's tradition of strong local control, the
GMA allows for considerable local variation and prescribes a
rather limited role for the state oversight agency, the Depart-
ment of Community Development (DCD).23 In contrast, the
Oregon and Florida laws provide for a much stronger state
19. See, e.g., Pierce Report, reprinted in THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 1-8, 1989.
Admittedly, by 1993 the common perspective of growth has changed. In the wake of
announced layoffs by a major industry in the northwest, The Boeing Company, in
many sectors growth is seen as a virtue to be encouraged, rather than a force to be
harnessed. Yet, the factors that gave rise to the conditions of the 1980s still exist, and
if they remain uncorrected, will again produce unbridled growth.
20. See Jeffrey M. Eustis, A Comparison of Statewide Land Use Planning
Measures: Initiative 547, The Growth Management Act, and the Growth Stategies
Commission Report, MID-YEAR CONFERENCE OF THE LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW SECTION OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1990). As indicative of its
greater strength, 1-547 contained an initial statement of statewide planning goals, just
as the GMA, but unlike the GMA, 1-547's goals applied to siting and project specific
decisions. Id. at 3-4.
21. OR. REV. STAT. ch. 197 (1991).
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(9), (10) (1990).
23. For example, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.190(4)(b) (West Supp. 1993),
delegates to DCD rulemaking authority for "procedural criteria," but these criteria
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role. Consequently, the GMA is often characterized as a "bot-
toms up" approach.'
B. An Overview of the Act
The GMA is lengthy and comprehensive.25 It has also
been amended in each of the legislative sessions following its
enactment in 1990.26 Because a full analysis of the GMA is
beyond the scope of this Article, only its principal require-
ments will be summarized here. The changes brought about by
the GMA can be summarized under the following nine points.
First, the GMA established thirteen statewide goals that
are to be the core of regional and local planning.' These goals
are to be "used exclusively for the purpose of guiding the
development of comprehesive plans and development regula-
tions."'  Among these goals are requirements that urban
growth be directed to established urban areas, that resource
lands for timber and agriculture be protected, and that trans-
portation and other public facilities and services be adequate to
serve the needs of development.'
Second, the GMA mandates comprehensive planning for
the state's most rapidly growing counties and for all cities lying
within those counties. ° Other counties and cities are permit-
ted to opt in. 1 Although the GMA originally applied to twelve
counties, a total of twenty-six of Washington's thirty-nine
counties are now planning under the GMA. This includes the
one hundred eighty-one cities lying within those counties.32
Third, the GMA requires that plans be implemented
through regulatory controls and that those controls be consis-
must reflect the "regional and local variations and the diversity that exists among
different counties and cities that plan under [the Act]." Id
24. See DEP'T OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, THE WASHINGTON STATE GROWTH
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, A BOTTOM UP PRIMER 1 (Oct. 1991).
25. The GMA was passed by the legislature under ESHB 2929, which totalled 82
pages.
26. See RESHB 1025, 1st Sp. Sess., 1991 Wash. Laws 2903, ch. 32; SB 6401, 1992
Wash. Laws 1050, ch. 227; ESHB 1761, 1st Spec. Sess., 1993 Wash. Laws 2564, ch. 6.
27. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020 (West 1991).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 36.70A.020(1), (8), (12).
30. Id § 36.70A.040(1).
31. 1d § 36.70A.040(2).
32. Washington State Department of Community Development, Growth
Management Program, Summary of Jurisdictions Planning Under the Growth
Management Act (June 1992).
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tent with the adopted plans.33 Previously, plans served only as
guides for zoning, lacking any legally enforceable standard of
consistency.3
Fourth, the GMA integrates land use planning with plan-
ning for transportation and other public facilities, requiring
that these facilities be concurrently available for develop-
ment.35 Specifically for transportation, each jurisdiction plan-
ning under the GMA must enact an ordinance prohibiting new
development if concurrency standards cannot be met."
Fifth, the GMA addresses urban sprawl by requiring that
jurisdictions designate urban growth areas and direct future
growth into those areas.37 Urban growth areas are defined as
areas either with urban growth or where urban growth is
appropriate. 38 Outside of urban growth areas, growth may
occur only if it is not urban in nature.39
Sixth, the GMA requires that certain areas be designated
to receive special protections. These areas include natural
resource lands (agricultural, forest, and mineral lands) and
certain critical areas (wetlands, geologically hazardous areas,
frequently flooded areas, aquifer recharge areas, and wildlife
habitat).4° These designations and protections must be adopted
prior to the adoption of plans and development regulations and
no later than March 1, 1992.4'
Seventh, the GMA specifically authorizes the levying of
impact fees for certain public facilities and services (roads,
parks, schools, and fire protection) and for tenant assistance
programs.' Previously, only "voluntary" development fees
were allowed.43
Eighth, the GMA requires some degree of regional plan-
ning. All counties that plan are required to develop a set of
33. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.120 (West 1991).
34. See, e.g., id. § 35A.63.061 (West 1990) (comprehensive planning applicable to
cities operating under the Optional Municipal Code); Lutz v. Longview, 83 Wash. 2d
566, 574, 520 P.2d 1374, 1379 (1974) (comprehensive plan is not a regulatory measure,
but serves simply as a guide for such measures).
35. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020(12) (West 1991).
36. Id, § 36.70A.070(6)(e).
37. Id. § 36.70A.110.
38. IcL §§ 36.70A.030(14), (15), .110 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
39. Id. § 36.70A.110(1) (West Supp. 1993).
40. Id. § 36.70A.060(1).
41. Id, § 36.70A.060(2).
42. Id. § 82.02.050.
43. Id § 82.02.020.
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county-wide planning policies that provide a framework for the
plans later adopted by the county and its constituent cities."
Additionally, the three most populous counties (King, Pierce,
and Snohomish) are required to develop multi-county policies
for the same purpose.45 These county-wide plans are in addi-
tion to county-wide transportation planning required under the
GMA.
Finally, the GMA, as amended in 1991, contains special sit-
ing provisions. Local plans are required to include a process
for selecting sites for "essential public facilities," such as air-
ports, schools, transportation facilities, correctional institu-
tions, and solid-waste facilities.4 6 Additionally, counties
planning under the GMA may adopt special procedures for sit-
ing new, fully-contained communities and recreational resorts
outside of urban growth areas.47
C. Administration and Enforcement
Implementation of the GMA rests largely on the shoulders
of local government. The DCD plays more of an information
and assistance role than a regulatory and enforcement role. Its
rulemaking function is limited to creation of guidelines for
classifying resource lands and critical areas4 and to providing
procedural criteria for plan adoption.a9 Even these rules leave
a tremendous amount of discretion to the local level.' And as
to substantive review of plans and development regulations,
DCD and other state agencies are entitled to comment,"' but
do not certify plans as being in compliance with the GMA.
Enforcement of the GMA requirements will be carried out
principally on an ad hoc basis through appeals concerning spe-
cific plans and regulations. The 1991 amendments to the GMA
provide for enforcement through an administrative appeals
board and a system of incentives and sanctions. Denominated
44. Id § 36.70A.210.
45. I& § 36.70A.210(7).
46. Id § 36.70A.200.
47. Id § 36.70A.350 (new fully contained communities); id § 36.70A.360 (master
planned resorts).
48. Id § 36.70A.050 (West 1991).
49. Id § 36.70A.190(4)(b) (West Supp. 1993).
50. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 365-190 (Supp. 1991) (minimum guidelines for
resource lands and critical areas), and § 365-195 (1992), Wash. St. Reg. §§ 92-18-097, 92-
23-065 (effective Dec. 19, 1992) (procedural criteria for comprehensive plans and
development regulations).
51. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.106(1).
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the Growth Planning Hearings Board (GPHB), the appeals
board has jurisdiction over the following areas: (1) compliance
of local plans and regulations with the GMA and the State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA); (2) county-wide policies; (3)
the twenty-year population projections prepared by the state
Office of Financial Management; and (4) the approval of new
communities.52 An appeal to the GPHB may be taken by the
state, a city or county, or any person who appeared during
deliberations or is certified by the governor as having
standing.53
The GMA uses both carrots and sticks to ensure compli-
ance. As an incentive to conduct the required planning, the
GMA makes adoption of the required plans a prerequisite to
qualification for loans or pledges for public works projects and
water pollution control facilities.' For noncompliance, the
GMA grants the governor authority to withhold certain funds
from state agencies and local governments. These funds
include allotments from the motor vehicle fuel tax, the sales
and use tax, and the liquor profit and excise taxes.
Having set forth a summary of the GMA's requirements,
this Article will now review the constitutional limitations that
confront local governments in the implementation of these
requirements.
II. TAKINGS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LAW
IN WASHINGTON
What in theory are two distinct constitutional doctrines
are in practice blurred together. The Washington State
Supreme Court has characterized the challenge of treating
these two separate constitutional doctrines as being "[1]ike han-
dling flypaper";' the court has found it difficult to place one
doctrine down while picking up the next. Consequently,
recent case law has run takings and substantive due process
52. Id. § 36.70A.280(1) (jurisdiction over adoption of plans, regulations and
population projections); id. § 36.70A.210(6) (jurisdiction over county-wide policies); id.
§ 36.70A.350 (approval of a new community is an amendment to the comprehensive
plan and therefore reviewable by the GPHB).
53. Id, § 36.70A.280(2).
54. Id. § 70.146.070 (West 1992) (water pollution control facilities).
55. Id. § 36.70A.340(2) (West Supp, 1993).
56. Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 48, 830 P.2d 318, 327, cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 676 (1992).
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analyses together.57 Therefore, in order to pass constitutional
muster, legislation must survive both the takings and substan-
tive due process tests. In recent cases, these tests have been
administered through a veritable maze of questions. Before
navigating this maze, however, it will be helpful to identify the
similarities and differences between these two constitutional
doctrines.
A. Comparison of Takings and Substantive
Due Process Doctrines
At the core of both the takings and substantive due pro-
cess doctrines is an act of balancing and a determination of
fairness. The balancing weighs the character of the govern-
mental action against the economic impact on the property
owner. The fairness determination requires a judgment by
the court that "[o]ne landowner should not be forced to bear
the economic burden to confer a benefit upon the public, the
cost of which rightfully should be spread over the entire
community."5 9
The fairness determination is based on an identical princi-
ple for both doctrines. In Presbytery of Seattle v. King
County,6° the court enunciated this standard of fairness in the
context of its taking analysis. More recently, in Robinson v.
Seattle,6 ' the same test was articulated as the basis for the
court's invalidation of Seattle's Housing Preservation Ordi-
nance on substantive due process grounds.
The fairness determination, however, serves different pur-
poses under each of these constitutional doctrines. Under tak-
ings analysis, regulation beyond the point at which the court
determines that Fifth Amendment protections have been
exceeded results in a taking.62 The remedy, however, is not
invalidation of the regulation, but compensation for the inter-
est that has been taken. For takings purposes, the inquiry is
whether the regulation in question is so restrictive that it con-
57. See, e.g., Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 398; Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle, 119
Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); Presbytery of Seattle v.
King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
58. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51, 830 P.2d at 328.
59. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
60. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
61. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
62. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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structively results in the exercise of eminent domain.6s In con-
trast, the remedy for a substantive due process violation is
invalidation of the enactment itself." Thus, the inquiry for
substantive due process purposes is whether "the police power
... has exceeded its constitutional limits."6'
B. The Analytical Framework Used in Washington
In Presbytery, the Washington State Supreme Court laid
out an analytical framework for takings and substantive due
process analysis. The Presbytery decision represented a second
attempt in recent years to clarify what is acknowledged to be
the "most perplexing area of American land use law."' This
interjection of clarity was necessitated by an apparent disconti-
nuity that resulted from the extensive elaboration on takings
and due process standards in Orion Corp. v. State67 and the
same court's seeming departure from that analysis in
Allingham v. Seattle.' The court's urgency to set the doctrinal
record straight seems all the more apparent because its clarifi-
cation was largely set forth in dicta. The carefully crafted ana-
lytical framework never received application in Presbytery
63. Id. at 419. Because this type of regulation occurs outside of a formal
condemnation process, it has been characterized as an "inverse condemnation."
64. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 332 n.20, 787 P.2d at 913-14 n.20.
65. Id. at 330, 787 P.2d at 913.
66. Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See
14 Now You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 339, 339 (1989).
67. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). In
Orion, the landowner had proposed to fill in large portions of 11,000 acres of Padilla
Bay, north of the Skagit River delta in Skagit County, but was not permitted to do so
under the state Shoreline Management Act of 1971 and legislation creating the Padilla
Bay Estuarine Sanctuary. Orion challenged these enactments as regulatory takings.
In a very lengthy and elaborate opinion, the court attempted to make coherent state
and federal law with regard to takings analysis. Ultimately, the court reversed the
trial court's finding of a regulatory taking on summary judgment and remanded the
matter for trial on the takings issue. Id. at 669-70, 747 P.2d at 1088.
68. 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988), overruled in part by Presbytery of
Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990). See Presbytery, 114
Wash. 2d at 323, 787 P.2d at 909; Settle, supra note 66, at 342. Within two months of
Orion, the court passed down a decision in Allingham, which was notable in its
outcome, its brevity, and its failure to even mention the carefully laid out analysis in
Orion.
In Allingham, landowners had challenged a Seattle greenbelt ordinance, which
essentially required that designated lands be left in a natural state. The ordinance
contained a savings limitation that rendered no lot undevelopable. Ignoring its prior
analysis in Orion, the court held that by preventing profitable use of 50 to 75 percent
of a parcel of property, the ordinance effected a taking. Allingham, 109 Wash. 2d at
952-53, 749 P.2d at 163.
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because the case itself was decided on exhaustion grounds. 9
Nonetheless, the analytical framework announced in Presby-
tery has received application in subsequent decisions.7 °
1. Threshold Inquiry
Under Washington law, the court begins its analysis of
takings and due process claims with a threshold inquiry. This
inquiry asks two questions. First, whether the challenged reg-
ulation protects the public interest in health, safety, the envi-
ronment or the fiscal integrity of an area. Second, whether the
regulation destroys or derogates any fundamental attribute of
ownership: the rights to possess exclusively, to exclude others,
and to dispose of property.7 If the answer to this two-part
inquiry is that the regulation does not destroy a fundamental
attribute of ownership and does nothing more than protect the
public health, safety, and welfare, then the regulation cannot
amount to a taking and there exists no entitlement to compen-
sation.72 In that event, however, a challenged regulation may
still be subject to a substantive due process challenge.73 On the
other hand, if a regulation fails the threshold inquiry it must
then be reviewed for a taking.
2. Takings Analysis
Takings analysis is applied if the threshold inquiry does
not remove the possibility of a taking. In this analysis, the first
determination is "whether the regulation substantially
advances legitimate state interests."7 4 If it does not, then the
69. In Presbytery, the property owner challenged the King County wetlands
ordinance on grounds that the law prevented it from subdividing its property into
more than two residential lots. The Presbyterian Church of Seattle challenged the
ordinance as a regulatory taking without ever submitting an application for
development of the property. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 324, 787 P.2d at 909-10. The
court, however, characterized the action as an "applied" challenge. Id. at 337, 787 P.2d
at 916. Without a factual determination as to the uses to which the property could
ultimately be put, the court concluded that the challenge to the wetlands ordinance
was not ripe for review under either the Takings Clause or substantive due process.
Id.
70. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49-55, 830 P.2d at 327-30; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 12-
24, 829 P.2d at 771-77.
71. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329-30, 787 P.2d at 912; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at
49-50, 830 P.2d at 328.
72. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 912; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50,
830 P.2d at 328.
73. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 912-13; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at
50, 830 P.2d at 328.
74. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328.
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regulation is a per se taking. If the regulation is found to
advance legitimate state interests, the regulation is next
reviewed for either a "facial" challenge or an "as applied" chal-
lenge.75 A facial challenge exists where the application of the
challenged regulation is claimed to result in a taking of any
parcel of regulated property. An "as applied" challenge exists
where a regulation is challenged as it applies to a specific par-
cel of property.76
In a facial challenge, if a landowner is able to show that
the challenged regulation "denies all economically viable use
of any parcel of regulated property," a taking will be found.77
In an "as applied" challenge, the court determines whether a
taking has occurred based on consideration of the following
three factors: "(1) the economic impact of the regulation on
the property, (2) the extent of the regulation's interference
with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of
the government action."78 If, at the end of this analysis, the
court determines that a taking has occurred, then just compen-
sation is required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the
Washington State Constitution.79
3. Substantive Due Process Analysis
Whether or not a regulation passes the threshold test for a
taking, it must still be reviewed to determine whether the
exercise of the police power has exceeded constitutional lim-
75. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50,
830 P.2d at 328.
76. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328.
77. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333-34, 787 P.2d at 914; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at
50, 830 P.2d at 328.
78. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335-36, 787 P.2d at 915; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at
51, 830 P.2d at 328.
79. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 336, 787 P.2d at 916. The Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution reads in pertinent part as follows: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
requirement has long been imposed on state governments and their political
subdivisions through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
The Washington State Constitution reads in pertinent part as follows: "No private
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation having first been made or paid into the court for the owner .... WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 16. The Washington State Supreme Court has construed the state
constitutional provision to be identical to that of the federal Constitution. Presbytery,
114 Wash. 2d at 332 n.20, 787 P.2d at 913-14 n.20 (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 109
Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988)).
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its." Here the court applies a three pronged due process test:
(1) whether the regulation aims to achieve a legitimate public
purpose, (2) whether the means adopted are reasonably neces-
sary to achieve that purpose, and (3) whether the regulation is
unduly oppressive on the property owner.8 '
In administering this test, the court scrutinizes the chal-
lenged action for any "unduly oppressive" effect. To guide this
inquiry, the court has listed no shortage of considerations:
The "unduly oppressive" inquiry lodges wide discretion in
the court and implies a balancing of the public's interest
against those of the regulated landowner. We have sug-
gested several factors for the court to consider to assist it in
determining whether a regulation is overly oppressive,
namely: the nature of the harm sought to be avoided; the
availability and effectiveness of less drastic protective meas-
ures; and the economic loss suffered by the property
owner.8 2
If, after consideration of these factors, a regulation fails to
pass the substantive due process analysis, then it is subject to
invalidation. 3 Additionally, through the federal Civil Rights
Act,s4 substantive due process violations may form the basis for
an action in damages.ss
80. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 913; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51,
830 P.2d at 329.
81. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 913; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51,
830 P.2d at 328-29.
82. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51-52, 830 P.2d at 329 (quoting Presbytery, 114
Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913). For further refinement, these three factors-nature
of harm, less drastic alternatives, and economic loss--are recast into nine differently
worded "non-exclusive factors" for applying the unduly oppressive balancing test:
On the public's side, the seriousness of the public problem, the extent to
which the owner's land contributes to it, the degree to which the proposed
regulation solves it and the feasibility of less oppressive solutions would all be
relevant. On the owner's side, the amount and percentage of value loss, the
extent of remaining uses, past, present and future uses, temporary or
permanent nature of the regulation, the extent to which the owner should
have anticipated such regulation and how feasible it is for the owner to alter
present or currently planned uses.
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913 (citing William Stoebuck, San Diego
Gas: Problems, Pi(falls and a Better Way, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 33
(1983)).
83. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331-32, 787 P.2d at 913; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at
52, 830 P.2d at 329.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
85. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 52, 830 P.2d at 329; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 23, 829
P.2d at 777.
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C. The Analytical Framework as Applied in Recent Cases
This analytical framework has been recently applied in the
Robinson v. Seattle" and Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle 7 decisions,
which arose out of challenges to Seattle's Housing Preservation
Ordinance (HPO). This ordinance provided that before a
change of use or demolition of existing housing units could
occur, a developer would be required to: (1) pay a fee to be
used for the construction or rehabilitation of low-income hous-
ing; (2) provide for 120-day notice of intended demolition; and
(3) pay up to $1000 per family in relocation assistance." The
ordinance was subsequently amended to allow applicants for
demolition permits to construct replacement housing in lieu of
fee payment, and to provide for a reasonable use exception
that waived the replacement housing requirement if compli-
ance would deprive a landowner of all economically viable use
of the property. 9 The original HPO was invalidated by the
King County Superior Court as an improper taxf 0 When the
HPO was amended in an attempt to cure its defects, the
revised ordinance was also struck down as an unauthorized
tax." This decision was upheld on appeal in San Telmo Associ-
ates v. Seattle.92 Until this decision, the City had continued to
enforce the housing replacement requirement of the HPO
against all developers except San Telmo.
1. Robinson v. Seattle
In Robinson, the named plaintiffs brought a class action on
behalf of all persons who had paid housing replacement fees
and tenant relocation assistance during the period that the
HPO had been enforced. Plaintiffs alleged that the continued
enforcement of the HPO constituted a taking and a violation of
substantive due process. On these grounds, the plaintiffs also
sought recovery of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The trial
court dismissed the damage claims under Section 1983, but
granted recovery of past payments under the HPO.'
86. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
87. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
88. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 42, 830 P.2d at 324.
89. Id. at 43, 830 P.2d at 324-25.
90. Id. at 43, 830 P.2d at 324.
91. Id. at 44, 830 P.2d at 325.
92. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
93. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
94. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 45-46, 830 P.2d at 326.
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On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court found
that the HPO failed the threshold test under the taking analy-
sis. The court held that the ordinance went beyond the pre-
vention of harm by imposing on private landowners the burden
of providing replacement housing that, in the opinion of the
court, "was one best borne by the community rather than by
individuals.... But, as the court went through its taking
analysis, it concluded that the HPO did serve legitimate state
interests and did not deny all economically viable use of any
regulated property. Accordingly, no facial taking was found.
And, because the challenge did not relate to any particular par-
cel of property, the court did not engage in an "as applied"
analysis. Therefore, the court found no regulatory taking.'
On substantive due process grounds, the court concluded
that the HPO was unduly oppressive. In so concluding, the
court principally relied on San Telmo Associates v. Seattle,97 in
which it reasoned that the need for providing additional low-
income housing was a burden to be shared by the city at large,
rather than one imposed on individual property owners. Hav-
ing found a substantive due process violation, the court pro-
ceeded to hold that this violation would give rise to liability
and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle
Sintra involved a property owner who had sought to con-
vert a residential hotel to a mini-storage building. For prop-
erty that the owner had purchased for $670,000, the City had
required payment of $219,840 under the HPO as a condition for
issuance of a demolition permit. The City insisted on payment
of the fee from the time that it was imposed in 1985 until 1987,
when the San Telmo decision was rendered. However, by the
time that the demolition fee had been lifted, the developer had
claimed that the proposed use was no longer economically via-
ble. The developer sued the City for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for a violation of substantive due process and an uncon-
stitutional taking for claims of inverse condemnation and
wrongful interference with business expectancy.98
The court characterized Sintra's claims as an "as applied"
95. Id. at 53, 830 P.2d at 330.
96. Id.
97. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 25, 735 P.2d 673, 675 (1987).
98. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 6-10, 829 P.2d at 768-70.
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takings challenge. Applying the three factors, the court found
the character of the governmental action to be indicative of a
taking, but found the record insufficient to make the necessary
factual determinations regarding the economic impact of the
regulation and its interference with investment-backed expec-
tations. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for proof
that no viable use of the property remained.9
On substantive due process grounds, the Sintra court
found the HPO to be unduly oppressive. The court relied on
the San Telmo reasoning and cited the tremendous economic
impact that the HPO placed on the developer (a fee equal to
approximately one-third the value of the property) and the
City of Seattle's continuing enforcement of an ordinance that
the court considered to be a "deliberate flouting" of its prior
orders.1" On the claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the matter was remanded for trial.
In both Robinson and Sintra, the substantive due process
requirements receive far more rigorous application than in
other non-land use cases. In areas of economic legislation, the
court has previously repudiated the notion that regulations
could be struck down as "unduly oppressive."101 Thus, the
court leaves unanswered several questions. Is its heightened
substantive due process review only applicable to the regula-
tion of property rights? If so, what is the basis for that limita-
tion? Do there exist due process guarantees and other
protections for property rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in addition to those provided under the Fifth Amend-
ment and substantive due process standards that are not
otherwise applicable to non-land use economic legislation? Or,
are Robinson and Sintra applicable to all areas of legislation?
These and other questions will no doubt be posed in subse-
quent cases.
D. Takings Analysis After Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission
The unique feature of Washington takings jurisprudence
following Orion and Presbytery was the creation of a category
of regulations that would be insulated from takings challenges.
99. I& at 17-18, 829 P.2d at 774.
100. Id. at 21-24, 829 P.2d at 776-78.
101. Salstrom's Vehicles v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 87 Wash. 2d 686, 693,
555 P.2d 1361, 1366 (1976).
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This is the category of regulations that pass the threshold
inquiry and are found to safeguard the public health, safety
and welfare, and do not involve infringement on a fundamen-
tal attribute of ownership. The United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 0 2
puts Washington's categorical insulation of certain police
power measures in question.
1. Lucas Creates a New Categorical Takings Rule
Lucas involved a dispute over the use of two waterfront
lots on a South Carolina barrier island. David Lucas purchased
the lots for $975,000 in 1986, intending to construct single famn-
ily homes. At the time, such development was permissible,
and, indeed, the adjacent properties supported single family
homes. However, in "roughly half of the last 40 years, all or
part of petitioner's property was part of the beach or flooded
twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide.' 10 3
In 1988, the South Carolina State Legislature passed the
Beachfront Management Act, which prevented Lucas from
building any permanent habitable structures on his land.
Without ever applying for any permits, seeking any variances,
or attempting to market or develop his property for any other
use, Lucas challenged this act on grounds that the construction
limitation constituted a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution. The state trial court agreed
and found that the Act rendered his property valueless and
entered an award in excess of $1.2 million. The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed the trial court judgment and held
that regardless of this economic impact on the property, the
Beachfront Management Act was designed to prevent serious
public harm and therefore could not constitute a taking.104
In a 5-1-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held
that South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act resulted in
a temporary taking of Lucas's property, and it remanded the
case to the South Carolina Supreme Court for a determination
as to whether a permanent taking had occurred based on the
principles set forth in its decision. 105
Lucas is significant for a number of reasons. First, the
102. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
103. Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 2887.
105. Id at 2888.
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Court created a new categorical taking for regulations that
deny all economically viable use of land. Second, Lucas nar-
rowed the prevention of harm exception to apply only to com-
mon law nuisances. Third, the Court hinted that in future
takings cases deprivation of all viable use may be based on only
the affected portion of property, rather than the parcel as a
whole. Fourth, the Court indicated a willingness to relax strict
exhaustion requirements. And fifth, the Court demonstrated
its increased reluctance to grant deference to legislative find-
ings. This case provides a significant boost to the interests of
property rights advocates in that each of these changes offer
greater protection to landowners. These changes are elabo-
rated on below.
To begin with, the most apparent effect of Lucas is to cre-
ate another category of per se takings. Previously, a category
of per se takings existed for actions that resulted in a physical
invasion of private property or interference with fundamental
attributes of property, such as the right to possess, to exclude
others, or to dispose of property."° Typical of these cases are
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,' °7 where the
Court invalidated a city ordinance compelling apartment own-
ers to allow installation of a transmittal box by cable TV com-
panies, and Kaiser Aetna v. United States,08 where the Court
concluded that a requirement to open a privately created
lagoon to public navigation constituted a taking. For other
types of regulations the Supreme Court has used a "multi-fac-
tor balancing test" to resolve takings disputes. °9 The Court
has refused to develop any "set formula" for this test; its out-
come is largely dependent on "the particular circumstances in
[each] case."' " 0 Thus, Lucas created a second, discrete category
of regulatory action that may be compensable without a case-
106. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 n.18
(1987).
107. 458 U.S. 419 (1992).
108. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
109. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 444.
110. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
This test balances the public interest promoted by the regulation against the economic
impacts on affected properties. Id. at 124-25. In considering the public interest, the
court looks to the nature of the regulation, its effectiveness, and the necessity of harm
to property owners. Id. at 127-29. In considering economic impact, the court examines
diminution of value, remaining value, and interference with investment-backed
expectations. Id. at 127-36. The balancing test does not establish a threshold of
economic impact at which a taking will result.
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specific inquiry."'
Second, Lucas narrowed an exception to this categorical
taking for cases in which the denial of all economically viable
use is based on "background principles of nuisance and prop-
erty law. 11 2  This exception applies when "the proscribed use
interests were not part of [the owner's] title to begin with. '11 3
Thus, Lucas substantially narrowed an exception to takings
challenges that previously applied to all regulations whose pur-
pose could be characterized as nuisance prevention." 4
Third, the Court indicated that it may be willing to divide
the parcel of property into discrete parts to determine whether
there has been a total deprivation of all economically viable
use. Historically, the Court has insisted that the economic
impact of a regulation be measured against the parcel as a
whole."5 Lucas, however, casts doubt on this proposition. In
footnote 7, the Court questioned whether it will continue to
view the parcel as a whole:
When for example, a regulation requires a developer to
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear
whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the
111. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
112. I at 2901-02.
113. Id. at 2899.
114. The nuisance prevention exception had its origin in the 1887 decision of
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1933), in which the Court upheld state legislation
prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic beverages. The site owner had challenged the
statute on grounds that it removed all practical use of his facilities. The Court
acknowledged this impact, id at 657, but went on to conclude that no taking could
result from legislation that was necessary to protect the public health, safety and
welfare:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation
of property for the public benefit.
Id at 668-69.
The Mugler holding has been subsequently followed in a long line of cases for the
proposition that harm prevention legislation cannot constitute a taking. See, e.g., Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and more recently in First Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The prevention of harm exception has also been fol-
lowed by the Washington State Supreme Court in Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 654, 749 P.2d
at 1080, and Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
In Lucas, the purpose of the remand was for the South Carolina Court to consider
whether the denial of Lucas's proposal could be supported based on the state's back-
ground principles of nuisance law. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
115. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
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owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use
on the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the
owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract
as a whole.11 6
Whether this uncertainty was caused by the factual basis of
available precedent, or by disagreement within the Court, the
Court does not appear eager to resolve this issue." 7
Fourth, Lucas relaxed the exhaustion requirement. In
prior cases, the court required takings claimants to fully
exhaust all procedural avenues for relief, including variance
procedures."" Lucas was a facial takings challenge; there had
been no applications for permits or variances. Pointing to the
lack of application, four dissenting Justices felt that Lucas had
not shown that his property had been left "valueless.""' 9
This relaxation of the exhaustion requirement creates a
number of uncertainties as to the circumstances that will
result in the deprivation of all economically viable use. For
the purposes of its opinion, the Court accepted at face value
the trial court's finding that the Beachfront Management Act
rendered the Lucas property "valueless." Although the State
never challenged this finding, it was not supported by the rec-
ord. As the dissenting Justices pointed out, there had never
been a determination of the value of the parcel for non-resi-
dential purposes, such as its value to adjoining property owners
116. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. How the Court would analyze the situation
carries importance for Washington takings jurisprudence. In Allingham v. Seattle, 109
Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988), the court struck down a greenbelt preservation
ordinance based on its effect on a regulated portion of land. In Alingham, the entirety
of the affected parcels remained developable. On the proposition that the assessment
of economic impact could be based only on one portion of the regulated parcel of
property, the holding in Allingham was expressly overruled in Presbytery. Presbytery,
114 Wash. 2d at 335, 787 P.2d at 915. In the event that the Supreme Court were to
abandon its view of the parcel as a whole, new life may be breathed back into
Allingham.
117. In Tull v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992), the Court recently denied certiorari
in a takings challenge to a wetlands ordinance. As applied to the claimant, the
ordinance prevented the filling of a three acre portion of a 12-acre parcel. The
landowner claimed a total taking of the regulated portion. See Appendix A to Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, Course No. 92-112. Thus, the case presented squarely the issue
of whether the takings analysis should be focused solely on the regulated area. One
may infer from the Court's denial of certiorari that there exist sufficient votes on the
Court to place in question the parcel as the whole approach, but insufficient votes to
change the law.
118. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 190-94 (1985) (holding that absent final determination as to how
regulation will be applied to particular land in question there is no jurisdiction).
119. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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for recreational purposes or for beach access." The majority
was willing to ignore this void in the record. Two explanations
emerge. First, the Court simply ignored the discontinuity in
the record in order to reach the holding that it otherwise
would have reached had the record been fully developed. Sec-
ond, a denial of the landowner's preferred use for residential
housing may amount to a denial of all economically viable use
for purposes of the categorical takings test. If the Court's
newly created categorical taking can be triggered by a denial of
a preferred use without an actual showing of a denial of all
use, then it may apply very broadly.
Fifth, the Lucas decision represents the Court's increased
willingness to look behind legislative findings. Traditionally,
courts have reviewed legislative determinations in areas not
involving fundamental rights or protected classifications under
the rational basis test.' 2 ' This test requires a high degree of
deference to legislative fact finding. Even where facts are not
offered in specific support of legislation, the Court has been
willing to uphold legislation as long as it could conceive of
some set of facts that would sustain the legislation. 22 Lucas
shifts the standard of review for takings cases to the other end
of the spectrum. Even where legislation is supported by find-
ings, the Court indicated an unwillingness to accept such find-
ings at face value. The Court goes even further and suggests
that the inability to make proper legislative findings may sim-
ply be the result of having a "stupid staff."' 3 Due to this skep-
ticism, the Court appears far more willing to accept judicial
findings on background principles of common law nuisance
that may be decades old, than it is to accept contemporary leg-
islative findings. Similarly, the Lucas Court was far more will-
ing to accept the unsubstantiated finding that the Lucas
property had become "valueless," than the evidence of past
erosion and flooding that the State of South Carolina had
advanced in support of its Beachfront Management Act.
2. The Effect of Lucas on Takings Law in Washington
At the very least, Lucas rearranges the order of the tests
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963).
122. Id.
123. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.12.
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under the Washington takings doctrine. First, under Presby-
tery, the denial of all economically viable use test applies only
after the court determines that the regulation is subject to tak-
ings analysis under the threshold test. Lucas elevates this test
to a separate threshold category of takings. Second, under
Presbytery, regulations intended to prevent harm are abso-
lutely insulated. After Lucas, if a regulation denies all eco-
nomically viable use, it is insulated only if the harm that is to
be prevented is rooted in common law principles of nuisance in
property.
This rearrangement of tests received its first application in
the Washington State Court of Appeals decision of Powers v.
Skagit County.1 24 Powers involved an application for a building
permit on a lot lying within the twenty-five year floodplain.
The lot lay in a subdivision that had been approved by Skagit
County in 1977. However, ten years later, the county adopted a
new floodplain management ordinance that prohibited new
residential construction within designated floodways. Based on
these regulations, the requested building permit was denied
and the property owner sued the county claiming that his
property had been taken without just compensation. 125 The
court applied the Lucas holding as a "'pre-threshold' step on
the Presbytery framework[,]" 126 which the court described as
follows:
At the outset, the plaintiff must have the opportunity to
demonstrate that the regulations at issue strip his property
of all economically viable use. The State at this point will
have the opportunity to rebut this claim with evidence that
some economically viable use exists for the plaintiff's prop-
erty. The State may further seek to show that plaintiff's use
is proscribed by "existing rules and understandings" of this
124. 67 Wash. App. 180, 835 P.2d 230 (1992). Subsequent to this article going to
print, the Washington Supreme Court in Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.
2d 1 (1993) specifically addressed the impact of Lucas upon the Presbytery takings
analysis. In squaring Presbytery with Lucas, the court concluded that "both 'physical
invasions' and 'total takings', as those terms are used in Lucas, are most appropriately
analyzed under the second prong of the Presbytery threshold inquiry, in which the
court examines whether a regulation infringes on a fundamental attribute of
ownership." Id at 598, 854 P.2d at 8. Thus, rather than considering the deprivation of
all use to be a separate categorical taking, the Washington court treats it as a type of
infringement upon a fundamental attribute of ownership. Apart from this minor
clarification, the analysis in Powers remains unaffected by the holding in Guimont. Id
at 599, 854 P.2d at 8 (holding in Powers cited with approval).
125. Powers, 67 Wash. App. at 182-83, 835 P.2d at 231.
126. Id. at 190, 835 P.2d at 236.
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State's property and nuisance law .... If the State prevails
on either (or both) grounds, the plaintiff will not be entitled
to categorical takings treatment under Lucas and the court
will proceed to analyze the case under the Presbytery
framework. However, if the court finds categorical treat-
ment under Lucas appropriate, then plaintiff will be entitled
to compensation for a taking without "case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in support of the
restraint.PP127
Powers was decided on motions for summary judgment.12 8
The court found that the record was not sufficiently developed
for it to make any determination as to a denial of economically
viable use.' Accordingly, the case was remanded to deter-
mine whether it was entitled to categorical takings treatment
under Lucas.13 0 Additionally, Powers claimed denial of sub-
stantive due process rights.13 ' The trial court dismissed this
claim on summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded for further proceedings as to the alleged "undue
oppressiveness" of the floodway regulation. 3 2
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR TAKINGS CHALLENGES
UNDER THE GMA
Having reviewed the recent takings and substantive due
process cases, this Article now addresses the effect of these
cases on potential growth management legislation. This analy-
sis focuses on four categories of legislation where takings chal-
lenges are likely to occur: (1) critical areas protections, (2)
resource land protections, (3) growth phasing regulations
through concurrency requirements and the designation of
urban growth areas, and (4) the imposition of impact fees.
These are not the only areas in which a takings or substantive
due process challenge could arise. These areas are the focus of
this Article because they are among the core requirements of
the GMA, they are among the earliest to be addressed, and
they are among the most likely to attract takings and substan-
tive due process challenges. Potential takings and due process
127. Id. (quoting Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893) (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 181, 835 P.2d at 231.
129. I at 194-95, 835 P.2d at 238.
130. Id. at 195, 835 P.2d at 238.
131. Id. at 195, 835 P.2d at 238-39.
132. Id. at 194-95, 835 P.2d at 238.
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challenges in each of these four areas are analyzed through the
following hypothetical situations.
A. Critical Areas Designations
All counties and cities in the State of Washington are
required to adopt development regulations that protect "criti-
cal areas" as defined by the GMA.133 Those critical areas
include the following areas and ecosystems: "(a) Wetlands; (b)
areas with a critical recharging effect on aquifers used for pota-
ble water; (c) fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas; (d)
frequently flooded areas; and (e) geologically hazardous
areas." 134
Among these five categories, wetlands regulations may be
the most likely target for takings and due process challenges,
because wetlands that are not adjacent to or associated with
the shorelines of the state have not previously been regulated
at the state level." Additionally, wetlands regulations largely
preclude any use of the regulated parcel. Finally, when consid-
ered with required buffered areas, wetlands protections can
restrict the development of substantial areas of land.13
A constitutional challenge to a wetlands ordinance could
arise under facts similar to the following hypothetical. Land-
owners have five acres in a valley. Their house, garage, drive-
way and horse barn sit on one acre. The remainder has been
used as a horse pasture. However, after their children leave
home, landowners sell their horses and have no further use for
the pasture. Other properties in the area have been subdivided
into one-half acre lots as permitted by applicable zoning. Now
the owners seek to do the same, and apply to the county for a
ten lot subdivision.
Under the local jurisdiction's GMA-inspired critical areas
ordinance, the subdivision application requires an initial criti-
133. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.060(2) (West Supp. 1993).
134. Id § 36.70A.030(5) (West 1991).
135. The shorelines of this state are regulated by the Shoreline Management Act
of 1971. Id. ch. 90.58 (West 1992). The shorelines of the state include all "associated
wetlands." Id. § 90.58.030(2)(d). The term "wetlands" is defined to mean lands
extending 200 feet from ordinary high water mark, floodways, floodplains within 200
feet of floodways, and marshes, bogs, swamps and river deltas associated with
shorelines of the state. Id § 90.58.030(2)(f). Isolated, or non-connected wetlands have
not been regulated under the Shoreline Management Act.
136. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY MODEL WETLANDS PROTECTION
ORDINANCE § 7.1.a (1990) (wetland buffer zone for Category I wetland ranges from 200
to 300 feet).
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cal areas review, which reveals that three acres lie in a wet-
land. Additionally, an acre of buffer area must be provided to
protect the wetland. Under a local provision for a transfer of
density from the wetland area to the upland area, the owners
are able to create two lots in addition to the parcel on which
their house sits, rather than the planned nine. At a net return
of $50,000 per lot, they determine that two additional lots
would provide them with a return of $100,000, rather than
$450,000 from the sale of nine. They view this economic impact
to be "unduly oppressive" and bring a challenge to the wet-
lands ordinance as applied to their property.
Whether this challenge succeeds as a taking under the"pre-threshold" Lucas test depends on whether the owner's
property is viewed in its entirety or the wetland portion is
treated separately. If viewed in its entirety, an approximate
eighty percent diminution in value will not constitute a taking
under Lucas.137 If the regulation survives the categorical tak-
ing rule of Lucas, it would also survive Washington takings
tests. A similar wetlands ordinance was found to be insulated
from a takings challenge in Presbytery.
Even if a court applied the Lucas categorical rule to the
regulated portion of the property, there is a strong basis for
concluding that no taking would occur. In this instance, in
order to survive the Lucas categorical test, it would be neces-
sary for the county to demonstrate that prohibition of develop-
ment was based on "background principles of nuisance and
property law."'13 There exist at least two grounds upon which
such a showing could be made.
First, Orion recognized that there may exist certain natu-
ral limits to the legal uses of land."3 9 In Washington, lands
underlying navigable waters, including tidelands, may not be
filled or obstructed if this would interfere with the rights of
navigation and recreation. 40 This "public trust doctrine" effec-
tively limits the lawful use of land underlying such areas, and
137. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8 ("It is true that in at least some cases the
landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will
recover in full."). Similar deprivations of value have been held not to result in takings.
See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (80% reduction); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (74% reduction); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)
(total loss).
138. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
139. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 659, 747 P.2d at 1082.
140. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316-17, 462 P.2d 232, 238 (1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
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it may either totally preclude a taking claim or substantially
reduce the damages arising from such a claim.'4' Orion also
recognized that the public trust doctrine protects not only
navigational rights, but also includes protections for wildlife,
isolated shorelands, and nonwater-based land that may have
special importance for the health, welfare, and safety of the
public."4 Thus, the public trust doctrine may supply the back-
ground principles of nuisance and property law that could sus-
tain a regulation which denies all economically viable use
within wetlands.
Second, a regulation that denies development within wet-
lands may be sustainable on grounds that the owners never
had a right to use the land as it was never suited for develop-
ment in its natural state. To support this proposition, Orion
cited to two cases in which the use of land had been similarly
limited. First, in Just v. Marinette County,43 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held the following: "An owner of land has no
absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it
was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights
of others."' 44 The court concluded that it was not unreasona-
ble to limit the use of property to its natural state. 45 Second,
in New Hampshire Wetlands Board v. Marshall,'46 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the denial of building per-
mits to fill a wetland. Applying a notice theory, the court rea-
soned that where the owners waited to develop their property
in the face of growing public concern over wetlands, there
could be no legitimate claim that their investment-backed
expectations had been frustrated. 147
Therefore, if the Lucas "denial of all economically viable
use" test were applied in a wetland regulation challenge, back-
ground principles of common law nuisance could satisfy the
exception to the total deprivation rule. Consequently, the
owners in our hypothetical may be left without a cause of
action for a taking.
Initially, it may appear that a substantive due process chal-
141. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
142. Id. at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10.
143. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
144. Id. at 768.
145. Id.
146. 500 A.2d 685 (N.H. 1985).
147. 1d. at 690.
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lenge to the wetlands ordinance would fare better. Such a
challenge would enable the owners to go directly to the
claimed oppressiveness of the ordinance,"4 without having to
expend considerable sums of money in the plat approval pro-
cess to exhaust administrative remedies. However, a key fac-
tor distinguishes this case from the assessment of housing
replacement fees as in Robinson. In Robinson, the court based
its holding on the policy that the problem of homelessness was
to be shared city wide, and not to be visited on the individuals
who happened to own low-income housing.'49 Nothing makes
one parcel inherently more suitable for low-income housing
than another, and nothing about a particular use of property
creates a need for low-income housing over other uses. But in
the case of wetlands, there is a basis for requiring wetland pro-
tections to be borne by individual properties."5 The location of
wetlands is largely the function of natural attributes of the
property itself, such as topography, subsurface geology, soils
make-up, and the ground and surface water regime.
Thus, the economic impact of wetlands ordinances on wet-
land owners is not likely to serve as a basis for invalidation
under substantive due process. Wetlands cases require a prop-
erty specific resolution because wetlands are property specific.
For these reasons, the wetlands ordinance will likely pass the
substantive due process balancing test.
B. Resource Lands
As to natural resource lands, the declared goal of the
148. Under substantive due process analysis, the court inquires as to whether the
challenged regulation seeks to achieve a legitimate public purpose, whether its means
are reasonably necessary, and whether it is unduly oppressive. Presbytery, 114 Wash.
2d at 330-31, 787 P.2d at 913. As the court was willing to conclude in Presbytery,
wetlands protections legislation serves a legitimate purpose and uses means reasonably
suited to accomplish that purpose. Id. at 337, 787 P.2d at 916. On the issue of unduly
oppressive impact, the Presbytery court found that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies. Id. at 337, 787 P.2d at 916. In view of the Presbytery
opinion, any due process challenge to wetlands regulations is apt to principally focus
on economic impact.
149. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 53, 830 P.2d at 330.
150. The Robinson court specifically distinguished its holding from how it would
treat environmental regulation of resources such as wetlands and shorelines:
We would distinguish our threshold determination in this case, however, from
that which may result when the development of a particular piece of property
would cause direct harm to the environment, such as the destruction of an
irreplaceable wetland or shoreline ecosystem.
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GMA is to "encourage the conservation of productive forest
lands and productive agricultural lands, and discourage incom-
patible uses."'151 All counties and cities that plan under the
GMA must adopt development regulations to ensure the con-
servation of agricultural, forest, and mineral resource lands."5 2
The declared goal of discouraging incompatible uses guides
these regulations. As illustrated below, the GMA creates
potential constitutional issues by mandating the regulation of
resource lands.
A hypothetical taking and due process case arises in a
rural county that previously had no zoning and only vague
comprehensive plan policies. In this county, residential devel-
opment outside of incorporated cities is governed only by the
Washington Subdivision Act. 53 If a subdivision applicant can
satisfy minimum requirements, such as adequate provisions for
access, septic sewer, storm drainage, and water supplies,
approval is granted." 4 Additionally, conversion of forested
lands to residential use requires approval by the county under
the Forest Practices Act.15 5 In practice, however, lacking any
policy basis to deny residential use in forested areas, the
county routinely approves forest land conversions.
Under these standards, county landowners developed a
widespread practice of acquiring forest land, harvesting the
timber, and converting the cleared site to residential develop-
ment through short platting. The county's short platting ordi-
nance allows the creation of a subdivision of up to nine lots
without the dedication of roads, the creation of a water supply,
or the testing of soils for on-site septic treatment.
An individual purchases a fifty-acre wooded parcel with
the intention to subdivide. The parcel is purchased at a price
in excess of the going rate for forest land, but one that would
make residential development highly profitable. Shortly after
site acquisition, but prior to any Forest Practice or subdivision
applications, the County enacts growth management policies
intended to protect forest lands. The County, in turn, imple-
ments these policies through development regulations that
establish a forty-acre minimum lot size and preclude any resi-
dential use. After the passage of these regulations, the forest
151. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020(8) (West 1991).
152. Id, § 36.70A.060(1).
153. IM ch. 58.17 (West 1990).
154. Id. § 58.17.110 (West Supp. 1993).
155. I& § 76.09.050(7).
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landowner submits a Forest Practices Act application and
requests permission from the County to convert to residential
uses. The owner contemporaneously files a short plat applica-
tion. The County denies both requests. The owner claims that
she cannot economically use the property for timber manage-
ment and, therefore, no economically viable use of the land
remains. The owner then initiates claims for taking and sub-
stantive due process violations.
A facial takings challenge would likely fail. Resource land
zoning for forestry and agriculture advances legitimate state
interests because it protects those lands from the encroach-
ment of incompatible uses. Additionally, resource land protec-
tions do not result in the denial of all economically viable use
if they allow continued designated uses. Therefore, the forest
land owner's taking claim would most likely take the form of
an as applied challenge."
The relevant economic impact of the forest land regulation
is not the regulation's effect on the land's value for forest prac-
tices, but the effect on the forest landowner's expectations to
convert to a more profitable use. Because the land retains
value for forestry, the economic impact of the regulation alone
would not likely result in a taking. Rather, the forest land-
owner's challenge is likely to be based on the alleged interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations.
Unlike the owners of the wetland property, the forest
landowner has concrete evidence of an investment-backed
expectation, including prior conversion practices in the county
and her purchase of the property for a value that reflected that
practice. However, these expectations are probably not suffi-
cient to establish a taking because they were predicated on the
County's prior failure to enforce forest land conversion limita-
156. In an as applied takings challenge, the court considers: "(1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the property; (2) the extent of the regulation's interference
with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action."
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335-36, 787 P.2d at 915. The economic impact test for
purposes of an as applied challenge concerns whether the property owner has been left
with "a reasonable fair market value" in light of legally permissible uses and potential
sales to non-governmental agencies. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 665, 747 P.2d at 1085.
"Investment-backed expectations" must have some "concrete manifestation" and must
be "appropriate under the circumstances." Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 336 n.29, 787
P.2d at 915 n.29 (citing Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is
There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 3 (1987)). The character of the
governmental action focuses on whether the challenged regulation results in a physical
invasion of the property. Id. at 336 n.30, 787 P.2d at 915-16 n.30.
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tions. Additionally, prior to the passage of forest land protec-
tions, the forest landowner had not "vested" her development
rights under the pre-existing laws by filing complete plat appli-
cations prior to the passage of the forest land protections.'57
On substantive due process grounds, Robinson and Sintra
are not likely to provide much help to the forest landowner.
As with wetlands regulations, a court would likely find that
resource lands protections serve a legitimate public purpose
and use reasonably necessary means to accomplish those pur-
poses. And, for the same reasons that forest land protections
would not create an undue economic impact for takings pur-
poses, they would not likely be unduly oppressive for due pro-
cess purposes.
Zoning controls on agricultural lands with impacts similar
to the forest land protections at issue here have been upheld
against takings and due process challenges in other jurisdic-
tions. In Virginia Beachfront v. Virginia Land Investment
Association No. 1,15 the court, against takings challenges,
upheld the downzoning of a planned development residential
housing category to an agricultural classification because eco-
nomically viable uses remained. Similarly, in Barancik v.
Matin,'5 9 the court upheld agricultural zoning against a sub-
stantive due process challenge. The agricultural zoning
required a minimum lot size of sixty acres. A landowner
sought to convert a ranch into a twenty-eight unit subdivision,
asserting that the ranch was no longer economically viable
because its tax liability exceeded its ability to generate
income." ° The County denied the plat and rezone application
and the landowner challenged the zoning limitation as arbi-
trary. The court found that it was within the County's discre-
tion to set aside the lands for rural uses:
157. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.033(1) (West 1990) (a subdivision application
shall be considered under the laws in effect on the date that a fully completed
application is submitted). This is the statutory application of Washington's common
law vested rights doctrine to subdivisions. The vested rights doctrine permits
developers to "fix" the rules that will govern their land development. West Main
Assoc. v. Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (1986). Under this rule,
"developers who file a timely and complete building permit application obtain a vested
right to have their applications processed according to the zoning and building
ordinances in effect at the time of the application." Id. at 50-51, 720 P.2d at 785. Under
the vested rights doctrine, the court has given judicial recognition of investment-
backed expectations. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 336 n.29, 787 P.2d at 915 n.29.
158. 389 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 1990).
159. 872 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).
160. Id. at 835.
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Marin's zoning no doubt preserves a bucolic atmosphere for
the benefit of a portion of the population at the expense of
those who would flow into the county if there was no zoning.
The Constitution lets that decision be made by the legisla-
ture. The Countywide Plan is a legislative declaration that
there will be a corridor in Matin agricultural in its use. The
choice was not irrational, the application to Barancik not
arbitrary.161
C. Concurrency and Urban Growth Areas
The GMA, through its concurrency mandate, requires that
public facilities and services adequately serve the population
and that development not expand too far ahead of the infra-
structure necessary to serve that development. The urban
growth area designation ensures that urban growth first occurs
in those areas where public facilities and services can be ade-
quately provided. These twin concepts are expressed in the
GMA through its declared goals to "encourage development in
urban areas where adequate public facilities exist or can be
provided in an efficient manner" and to "[i]nsure that those
public facilities and services necessary to support development
shall be adequate to serve the development at the time the
development is available for occupancy and use without
decreasing current service levels below locally established min-
imum standards.' 62
To carry out these goals, the GMA does the following: (1)
prohibits development that would cause transportation to fall
below adopted levels of service;" (2) prohibits developments
that would degrade groundwater quality;16' (3) requires capital
facility planning adequate to serve the land uses permitted
under the comprehensive plan;'65 and (4) requires proof of
available water supplies before the issuance of building
permits.16
In a hypothetical county, a landowner purchases inexpen-
sive land on the outskirts of a small, unincorporated town.
Zoned R-1, the property could be developed in single family
lots at a density of one dwelling unit per acre. Under the
161. Id. at 837.
162. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020(1), (12) (West 1991).
163. I& § 36.70A.070(6).
164. Id § 36.70A.070(1).
165. Id. § 36.70A.070(3).
166. I § 19.27.097(1) (West 1990).
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GMA, the landowner's property was not included within the
area that the county designated as an urban growth area for
the town. In order to maintain adequate levels of service
within designated urban areas, the county retracted earlier
plans to expand roads, water, and sewer to the landowner's
area. As part of a second ten-year plan, these facilities were to
be extended to the landowner's property.
The landowner asserted that the zoning must govern, and
submitted a subdivision application anyway. Although the
application conformed with the zoning, the county denied
approval because key intersections in the area already fell
below designated levels of service during commuter traffic
rush hours, the site was unacceptable for on-site septic sewage
treatment, and sewer lines would not be extended to the area
for another ten years. Without these improvements the county
would allow only residential development of at least ten acre
lot size, agricultural uses, and forestry. Claiming to be denied
an economic return on his property for ten years, the land-
owner sued.
From a takings standpoint, restrictions relating to concur-
rency differ from those relating to critical areas and resource
lands because they segregate property in a temporal, rather
than a geographic sense. Because the landowner may continue
to make the same use of the property as at the time of
purchase, a categorical taking under Lucas is not likely to
arise. Additionally, because regulations regarding the timing
of development are imposed to ensure adequate levels of ser-
vice for the residents of the property, the "unduly oppressive-
ness" test for substantive due process violations is also not
likely to be met.
In other jurisdictions, phasing controls that are far more
onerous have been upheld against takings and due process
challenges. In the watershed case of Golden v. Planning Board
of Ramapo,"7 the town adopted phased capital facility plans
covering a time period of eighteen years. To prevent prema-
ture subdivision and urban sprawl, the town awarded develop-
ment permits under a point system based on the availability of
essential facilities and services. The purpose of the permit sys-
tem was to ensure orderly growth and adequate facilities. 68
The court found that the legislative scheme fell well within
167. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
168. Id at 296.
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the ambit of permissible zoning legislation and rejected takings
and due process claims.
More recently, in Long Beachfront Equities, Inc. v. Ven-
tura,6 9 the court upheld a scheme similar to Washington's
urban growth areas. The adopted county guidelines required
that growth first occur in existing, incorporated cities. A prop-
erty owner sought to develop an unincorporated area for hous-
ing and a shopping center. The County ultimately denied the
proposal and downzoned the property to open space. The court
found the County's decision to focus development first in
incorporated areas to be a reasonable one and declined to sec-
ond guess the county.170
While Washington courts have not specifically addressed
growth phasing mechanisms, earlier zoning decisions indicate
that such land use controls would be favorably received. In a
case that involved what may be seen as an early precursor to
urban growth boundaries, the Washington State Supreme
Court in Shelton v. Bellevue171 upheld the City's authority to
draw a bright line between a low intensity residential district
and a higher intensity commercial district based on compre-
hensive planning. Similarly, in a decision that anticipates prin-
ciples of concurrency, the court in SAVE v. Bothell,172 upheld
the invalidation of a shopping center rezone that would result
in the premature conversion of agricultural lands to commer-
cial uses and inadequate transportation and drainage services.
These cases provide some indication that restraints on urban
sprawl would be upheld.
D. Impact Fees
To ensure both concurrency and consistency between capi-
tal facility and land use plans, cities and counties that plan
under the GMA are given the power to impose impact fees for
five categories of public facilities:173 streets and roads, open
spaces, parks and recreation facilities, schools, and fire protec-
tion. 74 Besides limiting impact fees to five categories of facili-
169. 282 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
170. Id. at 885.
171. 73 Wash. 2d 28, 40, 435 P.2d 949, 955 (1968).
172. 89 Wash. 2d 862, 872, 576 P.2d 401, 406-07 (1978).
173. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050 (West Supp. 1993).
174. Id. § 82.02.090(7). This authorization stands as an express exception to the
general rule barring the imposition of any tax, fee or charge upon the development of
land. Id. § 82.02.020.
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ties, the GMA also limits the extent to which fees may be
imposed: impact fees may only be imposed for improvements
that are reasonably related to the new development; fees may
not exceed a development's proportionate share of the costs of
the new improvements; and the new improvements must actu-
ally benefit the proposed development. 175 Finally, any financ-
ing system for facilities improvements must balance impact
fees and other sources of public funding.'7 6
Even with these limitations, impact fees can range from
insignificant to substantial. In King County, the typical road
impact fee is approximately $1,050 on a $200,000 house, or
approximately one-half percent.177 The King County Commis-
sion on Impact Fees reported that impact fees vary nationally
from $439 to $12,693 per single family home. 7 '
In a hypothetical case, a developer buys an abandoned
farm in a rapidly growing county. The county has included the
farm within its urban growth area and has planned to upgrade
two lane roads to five lanes and to build a fire station. The site
is located within an existing equestrian community and the
county plans to establish a park and trail system throughout
the area. To meet the expanding population, the school district
plans to construct three elementary schools, two middle
schools, and a high school. As authorized by the GMA, the
county has adopted an impact fee ordinance that establishes
fees on all development for roads and on all residential devel-
opment for schools and parks, including equestrian trails.
The developer seeks to create a townhouse development
targeted principally to older adults. The developer believes
that she will derive no benefit from the impact fees for the
equestrian trails, parks, and schools. The farm was purchased
for $670,000. Given the size of the development, the developer
has calculated her impact fee for all planned facilities to be
$219,840. Total construction costs for the development are
approximately $8 million. The developer balks at the impact
fee and claims that it renders her project uneconomic. She
pays the fee under protest and sues to recover it on taking and
substantive due process grounds.
175. Id. § 82.02,050(3).
176. Id, § 82.02,050(2).
177. KING COUNTY COMMISSION ON IMPACT FEES, IMPACT FEES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REGION'S POLICY MAKERS 23 (June 1992).
178. Id.
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To determine whether the impact fee ordinance resulted
in a taking as applied to this property, a court would consider
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the gov-
ernmental action.'79 In Sintra, an impact fee of similar magni-
tude was found to be a taking because no statutory authority
existed for the fee; thus, the fee was determined to be an ille-
gal tax on development.180 The court did not determine
whether the magnitude of the tax alone sufficiently impacted
the property to constitute a taking.' 8 ' Thus, the basis for find-
ing a taking in Sintra would not exist here because impact fees
for schools and parks are specifically authorized by statute' 82
Following the three-pronged substantive due process test
(legitimate state interest, reasonable means, and not unduly
oppressive), the court is likely to find that the impact fees
serve a legitimate public purpose in view of their use. The
impact fees for schools and trails would fund public facilities.
The legitimacy of the public purpose in imposing impact fees
was accepted by the courts in Sintra and Robinson.
Also, a court is likely to find that financing public
improvements through impact fees, rather than through local
improvement districts or school district levies, is reasonable.
The means test is satisfied because the fees are for improve-
ments related to the development, the fees do not exceed the
development's proportionate share of the costs of new facili-
ties, and the new improvements actually benefit the
development.
But, as in Robinson and Sintra, the developer's strongest
challenge may be that the impact fees are unduly oppressive.
As noted above, a determination of this unduly oppressive
prong involves a weighing of factors on the public's side as well
179. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335-36, 787 P.2d at 915.
180. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 18, 829 P.2d at 774.
181. Id. at 17, 829 P.2d at 774.
182. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050 (West Supp. 1993). An additional basis for
a takings claim may lie under the holding in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), on grounds that there would not exist the required nexus between the
impact of adult-oriented townhouses and the need for schools. However, the Sintra
court construed Nollan to require the nexus test to be satisfied for development
conditions involving only a physical invasion of property. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 16
n.7, 829 P.2d at 772 n.7. At least as applied by Washington courts, the nexus
requirement would not be applicable to impact fees. A challenge on nexus grounds
may serve to invalidate school impact fees on statutory grounds, given that impact fees
must be for improvements that are both related to and benefit the development.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050(3) (West Supp. 1993).
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as on the property owner's side. On the public's side, consider-
ation may be given to the following factors: (1) the seriousness
of the problem, (2) the contribution to the problem by the
owner's land, (3) the extent to which the proposed regulation
solves it, and (4) the feasibility of less drastic alternatives. 8 3
On the landowner's side, the court may consider several fac-
tors: (1) the loss of value, (2) the extent of remaining uses, (3)
whether the regulation is temporary or permanent, (4) the
extent to which the regulation should have been anticipated,
and (5) the feasibility of altering intended uses.' 4
When reviewed under these factors, the use and magni-
tude of impact fees to fund roads, schools, parks, and a fire sta-
tion would arguably not be unduly oppressive. First, on the
public's side, facilities such as roads, schools, fire protection
and parks are necessary to the orderly development of a com-
munity. Second, the development of any land within a new
area contributes incrementally to the need for new facilities.
While a townhouse for adults may not increase the school age
population, it contributes to the need for schools by drawing
new employees to the area, who in turn will seek housing
within the vicinity. A reasonableness standard is provided for
by the statute through the requirement that impact fees may
not exceed a development's proportionate share of the costs of
new improvements.'5 Third, a jurisdiction that bases its
impact fees ordinances on capital facilities and land use plans
is likely to demonstrate that the ordinance actually solves the
problem. Fourth, an impact fee ordinance that also relies on a
balance of public funds, as required by the GMA,S demon-
strates that the fees it has chosen are not unduly oppressive.
On the landowner's side, the loss of value may be dispro-
portionate compared to the purchase price. However, retaining
the property as a farm would result in no fee. Accordingly, the
total investment of $8 million is a better comparison for value.
This results in a fee of approximately two and one-half percent
of total development cost, which is well within the current
range of impact fees.18 7
The remaining factors on the landowner's side are not
likely to trigger a finding of undue oppressiveness in this hypo-
183. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913.
184. Id.
185. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050(3) (West Supp. 1993).
186. Id. § 82.02.050(2).
187. Compare KING COUNTY COMMISSION ON IMPACT FEES, supra note 177, at 23.
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thetical. Although the impact fees are permanent, lesser fees
would be incurred through lower intensity development. Fur-
ther, the exaction of development fees could have been antici-
pated from notice of the proposed legislation.188
However, simply providing a plausible response to each of
these factors may not guarantee that legislation passes muster.
By far the greatest variable in determining whether a regula-
tion survives a substantive due process challenge is how closely
the regulation is to be scrutinized by the court-an issue that
lies in a state of flux. The scrutiny exercised in Robinson and
Sintra departs from the deference that the court has tradition-
ally shown legislative enactments. In its review of substantive
due process claims, the court recently declared that "[t]he'unduly oppressive' inquiry lodges wide discretion in the
court."' s9 This departs from prior case law, in which the court
indicated its reluctance to second-guess policy judgments by
legislative bodies.19°
Robinson and Sintra also indicate that the ultimate deci-
sion may not turn solely on the court's enunciated factors. In
Robinson, the court reviewed the substantive due process fac-
tors only in passing. The court analyzed these factors as
follows:
We review these nonexclusive factors in balancing the City's
interests against the Robinsons'. The public problem of
homelessness is certainly serious. The extent to which an
owner's land or property particularly contributes to a public
problem may in certain instances be determinative, such as
in some environmental protection cases. However this factor
is not particularly crucial in this action because these urban
properties already have multiple potential uses. The
problems of homelessness and a lack of low-income housing
in Seattle are in part a function of how all Seattle landown-
ers are using their property. We further conclude that both
the feasibility of less harsh means of achieving the City's
purpose and the permanence of the nonzoning regulation in
188. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020(11) (West 1991). A principal goal of the
GMA is effective public participation.
189. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913 (emphasis added).
190. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 26-27, 586 P.2d 860, 865-
66 (1978) (If legislation tends to promote public health, safety, morals or welfare, "the
wisdom, necessity and policy of the law are matters left exclusively to the legislative
body."); Salstrom's Vehicles v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 87 Wash. 2d 686, 693,
555 P.2d 1361, 1366 (1976) ("That a statute is unduly oppressive is not a ground to
overturn it under the due process clause.").
Guidance For Growth
controlling the type of use of the landowner's property mili-
tate against the City.' 91
Under the court's analysis, these factors would support a
finding of constitutionality. But the holding of the court rested
on other reasoning:
This court has already said of the HPO that solving the prob-
lem of the decrease in affordable rental housing in the City
of Seattle is a burden to be shouldered commonly and not
imposed on individual property owners. We hold the HPO
to be an unduly oppressive, and thus unreasonable, regula-
tion. It therefore violated the rights of the Robinsons to sub-
stantive due process under our holding in Presbytery. .92
The earlier language in San Telmo, which the court relied
on in Robinson, is as follows:
[T]he City may not constitutionally pass on the social costs
of the development of the downtown Seattle area to current
owners of low-income housing. The problem must be shared
by the entire city, and those who plan to develop their prop-
erty from low-income housing to other uses cannot be penal-
ized by being required to provide more housing.'
And in Presbytery, the court offered a similar rationale for
why a regulation that sought to enhance a publicly owned right
in property, as opposed to safeguarding the public health,
safety and welfare, might result in a taking under the thresh-
old inquiry: "[O]ne landowner should not be forced to bear the
economic burden to confer a benefit on the public, the cost of
which rightfully should be spread over the entire commu-
nity."'9 4 But no where in these cases does the court cite to
authority for this proposition.19 5 Thus, prior case law provides
191. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. San Telmo, 108 Wash. 2d at 25, 735 P.2d at 675.
194. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
195. Language to similar effect appears in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1960):
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
Id at 49. Yet this decision involves a constitutional taking and not a substantive due
process challenge. The case arose from a challenge to a regulation that totally
removed the value of personal property (a materialman's lien). Moreover, neither the
fact situation nor the dicta have been relied upon by the Washington court.
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no guidance for determining when economic burdens must be
borne by the public at large. Nor does the court's bare pro-
nouncement of this proposition provide any standards for mak-
ing this judgment.
Consequently, under either substantive due process or tak-
ings analysis, if a case by case approach is used to determine
when a burden is more fairly shared by the public at large, it
becomes very difficult to accurately predict whether GMA
implementing legislation will be found to be unduly oppressive
for due process purposes or to enhance a publicly owned right
for takings purposes. Following Robinson, it is equally con-
ceivable that a court could strike down an impact fee ordinance
for facilities, such as schools and equestrian trails, that would
be less directly impacted by a townhouse on the grounds that
those facilities should be funded by the public at large through
general tax measures, rather than be borne in any substantial
part by new development.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington substantive due process cases and Lucas send
a clear message that courts will be increasingly reluctant to
obediently accept legislative findings. The Washington court is
willing to exercise "wide discretion" to separately balance the
legislature's allocation of burdens and benefits. The Lucas
Court takes its doubts even further. In holding that the pre-
vention of harm exception in takings cases must be rooted in
the common law of property and nuisance, the Court shows a
preference for judicial holdings, which may be decades or cen-
turies old, in place of contemporaneous legislative findings.
Neither court is willing to indulge legislative bodies in the
traditional presumptions that policy judgments are to be left
exclusively to the legislative body and that facts will be pre-
sumed to exist to support those policy judgments.19
This more exacting standard of review should be antici-
pated in the drafting of GMA legislation. Stronger factual
records, rather than boilerplate findings, can demonstrate that
the legislative bodies have made a reasoned choice among
available alternatives, and that the balance is a fair one. In
order to build an adequate factual record, and to avoid facial or
categorical takings claims, procedural remedies for reasonable
196. Duckworth v. Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
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use exceptions and variances should be provided. To a large
degree, careful drafting and attention to adequate procedural
remedies should avoid having growth management legislation
frustrated by takings and substantive due process challenges.
